Little progress has been made in climate negotiations on technology since 1992. Yet, the diffusion of climate change mitigation technologies to developing countries (non-Annex I) has increased dramatically over the last twenty years. The shift has mostly concerned emerging economies, which are now reasonably well connected to international technology flows. This is good news, as the bulk of emissions increases are expected to take place in these countries in the near future. In contrast, least developed countries still appear to be excluded from international technology flows, mostly because of their negligible participation in the recent economic globalization. The paper derives policy implications on the contribution of climate negotiations to international technology diffusion.
Introduction
Technology has been an important topic of international climate change negotiations since the adoption in 1992 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in which the parties committed themselves to "promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies" (UNFCCC, article 4.5). The focus is on North-to-South technology transfers, since technologies have so far been mostly developed in industrialized countries, while emerging economies, where the bulk of future emission increases are expected, are under urgent pressure to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Negotiations have been difficult between industrialized countries, which fear that ambitious technology transfer policies might deprive their innovative firms of vital intellectual assets, and developing countries, which see technology transfer as a costly process that should at least partially be funded by industrialized countries.. For these reasons, policy debates have so far revolved around the financing of technology transfer, capacity building, and the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs), which some countries view as a barrier to technology diffusion (Abdel-Latif, 2015) . Important The outcome is arguably modest because the TEC is mostly a new forum to discuss future solutions that remain to be developed, and the CTCN has a limited capacity, with an annual budget of USD 14 million in 2015. However, this moderate influence is only a problem if the diffusion of climate mitigation technologies requires strong international coordination over technology issues under the UNFCCC. Against this background, the objective of this paper is twofold. The first aim is to examine the reality of the international diffusion of climate mitigation technologies since 1992. Based on this diagnosis, the second objective is to discuss how future international negotiations could contribute to increasing technology transfer. Our paper shows that, despite modest progress in climate negotiations, North-to-South transfer of climate mitigation technologies has dramatically increased since 1992. This has mostly concerned emerging economies, which are now reasonably well connected to international technology flows. This is good news, as these are the countries in which most emission increases are expected to occur in the near future. In contrast, the rest of developing countries still seem excluded from international technology flows. This is less significant in terms of climate mitigation in the short run, as their emissions are still limited, but we think these countries present a critical challenge for the future that should be the focus of negotiations in the coming years. We offer some thoughts on what could be on the agenda at future negotiations. This paper presents up-to-date empirical evidence on the climate-related, capital-embodied technology transfer landscape, based on a combination of patent data, bilateral trade data and foreign investment data. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first time that such a multidimensional database on climate-related technology transfer has been assembled. Existing studies have essentially relied on two sources of data to describe climate-related technology flows: CDM projects (Haites, Duan and Seres, 2006; de Coninck, Haake, and van der Linden, 2007; Dechezleprêtre, Glachant, and Ménière, 2008; UNFCCC, 2012; Murphy, Kirkman, Seres, and Haites, 2015) and patent data (e.g., Hascic and Johnstone, 2011; Dechezleprêtre, Glachant, Haščič, Johnstone, and Ménière, 2011; Dechezleprêtre, Glachant, and Ménière, 2013) .
1 Despite its success, the CDM only presents a very partial view of the global transfer of climate change-related technologies towards developing countries. The coverage offered by patent data is potentially wider, but using foreign patenting as an indicator of technology transfer 2 has several limitations. In particular, filing a patent in a recipient country does not guarantee that the technology will actually be transferred. Combining patent data with trade and FDI data partly addresses these shortcomings.
However, despite their wide scope, our data do not comprehensively describe international technology transfer: information on some channels is missing (in particular, the international movement of qualified people), and, more fundamentally, quantitative indicators cannot fully reflect the qualitative richness of real-world knowledge transfers. We discuss these weaknesses and others in Section 3.
1 An exception is Pueyo and Linares (2012) who collected data on trade of equipment in hydro, wind and solar power and installed capacity in renewable electricity generation weighted by claims of technology transfer observed in CDM projects. The scope is however more limited than our study which covers a wide range of climate -mitigation technologies. 2 The fact that an inventor located in one country applies for patent protection in another country is an indication that the inventor expects to transfer the technology, as patenting confers the exclusive right to commercially exploit the technology in that country. 
Measuring technology transfer
The notion of "technology transfer" can be confusing, for these transfers may concern either intangible knowledge as such, or the physical support in which this knowledge is embedded. Its measurement is therefore inherently difficult. The economic literature 8 argues that technology and related knowledge may be transferred through voluntary transactions aiming at commercializing and/or exploiting technological products in the recipient country. Our first two indicators are based on two of these market channels: trade in capital goods and foreign direct investments (Popp, 2009 ).
9,10
International trade in intermediate goods. Importing capital goods, such as machines and equipment, entails technology transfer because such goods embody technologies that can bring productivity benefits to the recipient countries. As an illustration, China acquired production technologies to create a highly efficient solar photovoltaic industry by purchasing turnkey production lines from German, US and Japanese suppliers (de la Tour et al., 2011). Chinese companies are now able to design production equipment on their own.
Trade data is readily available from public sources, in particular the United Nations COMTRADE database, which reports bilateral trade between countries at a highly disaggregated product level.
The detailed trade classification system (a 6-digit classification of commodities) makes it possible to identify trade in equipment goods that incorporate technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (for example wind turbines). Glachant, Dussaux, Ménière, and Dechezleprêtre (2013) 
Foreign direct investment (including joint ventures).
Several studies find evidence that multinational enterprises transfer firm-specific technology to their foreign affiliates or partners in joint ventures 8 Keller (2004) offers a comprehensive survey of the economic literature on technology diffusion. 9 Licensing is a third channel of technology diffusion. Unfortunately, data on international flows of royalty payments are lacking. However, the evidence shows that technology transfers via licensing are of a much smaller magnitude than via trade and FDI. 10 More details on the data used in the present paper are provided in Glachant et al. (2013) .
(e.g., Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley, 2006) . FDI induces more knowledge transfer than trade in goods, since it aims at directly exploiting knowledge in a local subsidiary of the source company or in a joint venture -and no longer in the source country. The transfer is particularly important with joint ventures as the local partner has direct access to the technology. This is for example the key vector of technology transfer in the wind industry (Kirkegaard, Hanemann, and Weischer, 2009 ).
In contrast with trade data, publicly available FDI data are too aggregated to identify investments specifically related to climate change mitigation. For example, one can identify investment flows in the "Production of Electricity" sector, but not in the renewable energy production sector. For this reason, FDI data have very seldom been used to study low-carbon technology transfer. We use firmlevel data from Bureau Van Dijk's ORBIS database to measure technology transfer in 25 low-carbon technologies. ORBIS includes firm-level data on investment stocks in foreign countries (due to mergers and acquisitions, creation of a subsidiary, etc.). In order to identify parent firms using climate change-related technologies, we match the ORBIS database with the PATSTAT database (a global patent database, see below) and identify companies that own at least one patent in a climaterelated technology. This makes it possible to provide an indicator of FDI at the technology level. The indicator is obviously imperfect as many companies are multi-technology enterprises: on average across the 4490 parent companies in our dataset, technologies related to climate change mitigation represent 36.9% of their patent portfolio. Since information on asset value is not comprehensive for developing countries, we assess the volume of FDI through the number of subsidiaries, which is a more approximate, but more reliable indicator.
Non-resident patent filings
One drawback of the trade-and FDI-based indicators is that they do not directly measure crosscountry knowledge flows, but rather the flows of goods or capital with which they are presumably associated. The actual contribution to technology diffusion made by trade and FDI is likely to vary considerably across industries, markets and technologies. We therefore complement our assessment with data on non-resident patent filings. Patenting can be a measure of technology transfer because it gives the exclusive right to commercially exploit the technology in the country where the patent is filed. As patenting is costly, inventors request protection when they have plans to use the technology locally. For this reason, a number of studies have used patent data to measure international transfer of climate change mitigation technologies (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011) . The main advantage of using patents to measure technology diffusion is that they are available at a highly technologically disaggregated level, but the indicator is not without limitations (see Dechezleprêtre et al. 2011 for a detailed discussion). First, the value of individual patents is heterogeneous, implying that simply counting patents gives an imperfect measure of the volume of technology transfer. This is less of an issue in the present study to the extent that we focus on "exported" inventions, which have typically more value (Harhoff, Scherer, Vopel, 2002) . Second, the propensity to patent differs between sectors, depending on the nature of the technology (Cohen et al., 2000) . This explains why, when comparing technologies in the following section, we do not rely on absolute figures (e.g. the count of patents in a given country), but on relative indicators (e.g. the share of patents from that country in the total number of patents filed at global level in the same technology). Last but not least, although a patent grants the exclusive right to use a technology in a given country, we do not know whether the technology has actually been used. However, evidence shows that patent protection is relied upon for voluntary transactions aiming at commercializing and/or exploiting technological products in recipient countries, including through trade, FDI and licensing, because each of these technology transfer channels brings a risk of leakage and imitation (Maskus, 2000; Smith, 2001; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2013) .
Level of international diffusion of climate-related technologies
We now describe the international diffusion of climate mitigation technologies. The key message is that these technologies already cross national borders despite the absence of explicit international policies promoting technology transfer. As a result of this evolution, technology transfer towards fast-growing economies is now significant.
In particular, with 29% of global imports of low-carbon equipment goods, emerging countries play an active role in the international trade of these products. They are also significant exporters: 24% of the international trade of such goods originates from emerging economies. This indicates the success of countries like China in the production of equipment for producing renewable energy (e.g. photovoltaic panels, wind turbines). Statistics also suggest significant transfer in emerging economies through FDI (32% of the world's climate-related FDI links). Exchange of climate-related patents between the North and emerging economies is less significant (16% of global flows). A possible explanation is that technology owners mistrust the enforcement of intellectual property rights in emerging economies. The flow of climate-related patents or FDI between emerging economies is negligible (less than 1% of cross-country patent flows, 1.9% of FDI links), but trade between emerging economies is becoming significant (10% of the world's total). It is important to keep in mind,
however, that trade embodies less knowledge than other channels of technology transfer.
The situation of the rest of developing countries is totally different. These states have nearly no access to foreign green technologies as they are mostly connected to the global economy through raw material markets. Only around 2% of internationally patented inventions are filed in a least developed country and together these countries represent around 1% of the world's inward flows of low-carbon equipment and FDI links.
In Table 1 b Average of the import of low-carbon equipment as a share of world imports, covering 18 products/sectors (2007) (2008) (2009) .
c Capital links between a source company owning at least one low-carbon patent and a foreign company in 2011 as a share of world total. More details are provided in Appendix.
What role can future international negotiations play in increasing climate-related technology diffusion?
The above description suggests that the absence of strong international cooperation under the UNFCCC has not prevented climate-related technology transfer from occurring at a significant scale over the past decades. However, this does not mean that diffusion will keep increasing, or that cooperation will remain unnecessary in the future. The adoption of the Paris agreement brings new challenges in terms of enhanced climate action. Emerging economies are now major emitters and some LDCs may join this club in the coming years. What, then, should be the future priority for international coordination on technology diffusion? Given that the reality of technology diffusion is extremely contrasted between emerging economies and LDCs, the answer to this question is necessarily different for these two groups of countries.
5.1
The case of emerging economies Promoting market-driven technology transfers. In the case of emerging economies, there is no reason to think that they will not continue to effectively absorb foreign technologies. In this group, some laggards -South Asia and India in particular -will benefit from growing participation in economic globalization. In this regard, lowering barriers to trade and foreign investments is an important policy leverage to foster the transfer of green technologies. There is ample empirical evidence that technology diffusion is facilitated by an open trade regime (Saggi, 2002; Duke, Jacobson, and Kammen., 2002; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2013) . Regarding FDI, evidence also suggests that foreign investment responds to an adequate business environment, including governance and economic institutions (Maskus, 2004; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2013) . In this respect, Table 7 in the Appendix compares the major fast-growing economies featured in Table 1 along different indices that measure potential barriers to technology transfer. It clearly shows that there is scope for improvement. Tariffs on low-carbon equipment are particularly high in Brazil and India. The enforcement of patent rights seems particularly weak in Brazil, India and South Africa.
The case of patent law deserves more development, as some participants in the UNFCCC negotiation process argue that strict intellectual property rights may hinder the transfer of green technologies towards developing countries. It is worth restating that globally firms are by far the prime owners of technologies. The role of the private sector is thus absolutely critical. Keeping in mind that the prime goal of IPR is to promote innovation, the question of whether a stronger IP regime fosters international technology diffusion raises serious arguments and opposing conclusions. On the negative side, patents give market power to innovators, who may then be able to raise prices. This could in turn reduce demand, thereby slowing down diffusion (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995) . This property issue is particularly critical for inventions that are needed in developing countries with limited financial resources (for a discussion, see Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002 (Sampath and Roffe, 2012) . In this case, strong local absorptive capacities enable effective transfers, but also create a serious threat of imitation for foreign innovators (Maskus, 2000; Smith, 2001; Hoekman, Maskus, and Saggi 2005; Mancusi, 2008; Parello, 2008) . Because it provides a safeguard against such imitation, strong IP protection facilitates technology transfers in the recipient country.
However, IP rights have no significant impact in poor countries with less imitation capacity (Smith, 2001; Park and Lippolt, 2008) . Few specific results on climate mitigation technologies yield the same type of results (Ockwell, Watson, MacKerron, Pal, and Yamin, 2008; Barton, 2007; de la Tour et al. 2011 (Maskus, 2010) . This possibility has been used for pharmaceuticals. Against this background, there is serious motivation to transfer the discussion of trade and IP rules from the UNFCCC to the WTO, as both the GATT and the TRIPS seem sufficiently flexible to introduce climate-specific provisions if agreed by the parties.
Creating a demand for low-carbon technologies in emerging economies. Strengthening environmental regulation is a pre-condition to diffusing eco-innovations, as cutting emissions is
generally not yet profitable under standard market conditions. In the absence of public policies imposing constraints on carbon emissions, households and companies are unlikely to adopt climatefriendly technologies. This conveys what is probably the most important message of this discussion.
Diffusion of technologies towards emerging economies can only increase in the presence of ambitious climate policies (e.g. carbon taxes, cap-and-trade system, emissions standards).
During the past decade, three major channels have induced the diffusion of low-carbon technologies to emerging economies. First (but probably least importantly), the CDM has played a role in increasing domestic demand for low-carbon technologies. The empirical literature agrees that the CDM has encouraged North-to-South technology transfer (de Coninck et al., 2007; Haites et al., 2006; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008; Gandenberger, Bodenheimer, Schleichab, Orzannaa, and Gandenberger, 2015; Murphy et al., 2015) . Roughly 40% of CDM projects induced a technology transfer. Second, companies located in emerging countries have also imported technologies with a view to serving foreign demand driven by climate and environmental policies implemented in richer countries. For example, Chinese photovoltaic companies acquired the necessary technologies abroad before exporting PV cells and solar panels back to countries such as Germany, Spain, and the US, where feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards triggered massive deployment of PV electricity.
Third, emerging economies have implemented domestic policies to promote the deployment of green technologies. In India, the growth of wind energy was primarily driven by state-level feed-intariffs (FITs) introduced in 2000. This induced the development of domestic turbine manufacturers, which initially served domestic demand, but now compete in international markets --Suzlon is the 6th world producer with a global market share of 5.5% in 2014. The same evolution has been observed in China, which has also seen dramatic growth in producers of wind power equipment. Four
Chinese companies ranked among the world's Top 10 turbine manufacturers in 2014, Goldwing coming third behind Vestas and Siemens.
Looking forward, the CDM period is over. Almost 8,000 CDM projects have been registered to date, but the submission of new CDM projects has almost completely stopped since the end of the first Kyoto commitment period 2008-2012 (the price of carbon credits generated by existing CDM projects is close to zero at €0.39/tCO2 on 23 June, 2015) and the future of offset mechanisms in the post-Paris period is unclear. Article 6 of the Paris agreement allows for "the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve nationally determined contributions" and establishes a new mechanism to this effect, but the rules, modalities and procedures for this mechanism are yet to be adopted. Demand in foreign countries is likely to keep rising, but the relocation of the PV industry to China is a very contentious subject, in particular in Germany, and will probably remain so, as illustrated by the proliferation of local content requirements. Therefore, we see the implementation of emerging economies' Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) as central to the acceleration of technology transfer in the near future.
The rest of developing countries
The situation of LDCs is paradoxical. On the one hand, accelerating technology diffusion is critical as these countries are not yet connected to international flows of climate-related technologies; on the other hand, dealing with the problem is less urgent as their contribution to global emissions will remain limited in the near future. In these countries, the priority is to build technological capacities and promote their integration into the global economy. In fact, this means solving a very general problem: the economic development of certain countries and regions, in particular in Africa. In this context, the discussion of specific trade and IP rules for low-carbon technologies is at odds with the challenges these countries face today.
There is strong evidence that technological capabilities -such as availability of skilled technical personnel, information on available technologies, and social institutions that reduce transaction costs -determine a country's ability to successfully absorb foreign technologies (Worrell, Levine, Price, Martin, Van Den Broek, and Blok, 1997) . These skills are referred to as absorptive capacities (Keller, 1996) . Building capacities should thus be given priority through various means, including education, cooperative research, development, and demonstration programs. Importantly, green technologies draw on scientific knowledge from many sciences, among which energy and environmental sciences only play a marginal role (OECD, 2010) . This suggests that encouraging education and training in narrow technology fields may be less important than, and at best complementary to, generic programs that address a broad range of disciplines. Here again, the UNFCCC -which focuses on climate by its very nature -is probably not the only framework to coordinate internationally on these issues.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the lack of progress in climate negotiations on technology transfer has not prevented the international diffusion of low-carbon technologies to date, at least not towards This does not mean that international coordination on technology transfer and technological capabilities is useless. Nevertheless, we suspect that these issues might be better addressed outside the UNFCCC. This includes efforts to reduce trade barriers and resolve intellectual property issues in emerging economies, which are best addressed through the World Trade Organization, and generic capacity building in least-developed countries, which could be managed by established international institutions in charge of economic development in the South (i.e. World Bank, UNIDO).
In this international architecture, the UNFCCC will mostly contribute to encouraging the diffusion of low-carbon technologies by spurring demand for these technologies through ambitious emissionsreduction objectives both in the North and South, as set out in the INDCs. Ambitious climate change policies will also induce more research and development activities in low-carbon technologies in countries with strong research capabilities (including both developed and emerging countries), which will reduce the cost of deploying low-carbon technologies, thereby boosting their international diffusion.
These implications do not address the distributional dimension, which is essential in any negotiation.
As explained in section 2, technology transfer has become a prominent issue in negotiations, partly because it is seen as a way to compensate the developing world for the role played by industrialized countries in creating the atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide. is the result of an unprecedented effort by the European Patent Office, whereby patent examiners specializing in each technology, with the help of external experts, developed a tagging system of patents related to climate change mitigation technologies. The Y02 category provides the most accurate tagging method of climate change mitigation patents available today, and is becoming the international standard for clean innovation studies. We identify internationally transferred patents as patents filed by an inventor from a country different from that in which protection is sought, e.g., patents filed in the US by a German inventor. Table 3 presents the geographical coverage of the data along with their time dimension.
A4

Geographical coverage
Geographical coverage is almost comprehensive for trade and FDI data: the COMTRADE database includes all 192 United Nations member countries and the ORBIS database gathers information from 197 countries. With 80 patent offices in PATSTAT, patent data is not as comprehensive, but they include the major patent offices in the world. Given the geographical coverage of the combined dataset, we can confidently consider that if some countries (in particular least-developed countries)
do not appear across all three dimensions of the data set, the reason is that they do not participate in the international diffusion of technologies. There are, however, a few important exceptions: India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Thailand. 
A5 Technological scope
Our study covers a wide range of technologies across most sectors of the economy. Table 4 presents the precise technology coverage of the study. Obviously, not all technologies with a potential to mitigate climate change could be included in the analysis. The main reason is that their diffusion does not entail any patenting or international trade. This is the case for agriculture and forestry:
technologies such as soil restoration, reforestation, rice and grassland management are simply not present in either trade or patent data. Another reason is that classifications used in trade and patent data do not allow us to identify some technologies, in particular technologies aiming at improving industrial energy efficiency. In practice, saving energy in the industrial sector mostly consists of using a more energy-efficient version of production equipment; it does not consist of adding a device that specifically saves energy in the production chain. The problem is thus that patent and trade statistics are not detailed enough to distinguish between different versions of the same equipment. To give an example, the COMTRADE code 841780 describes "industrial/laboratory furnaces & ovens", but no distinction is made between inefficient and energy-efficient furnaces. Nevertheless, the technologies in our data set represent 65% of the abatement potential until 2030 as identified in the McKinsey abatement curve.
Patent and FDI data offer the most extensive coverage: they are comprehensive for energy production (including cleaner coal). They are also very good for transport and energy efficiency in buildings (insulation, heating, and lighting). Data on energy efficiency in industry are more limited (except for aluminum and certain equipment goods in heavy industries). Trade data are not as comprehensive, because product classifications used to organize trade data do not offer the same level of disaggregation, as illustrated above. 
